Criminal Law-Effect of Breach of Duty by Ministerial Officer-Sentences of State and Federal Courts by unknown
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 13 | Issue 3 Article 8
1-1938
Criminal Law-Effect of Breach of Duty by
Ministerial Officer-Sentences of State and Federal
Courts
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Courts Commons, and the Criminal Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School
Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
(1938) "Criminal Law-Effect of Breach of Duty by Ministerial Officer-Sentences of State and Federal Courts," Indiana Law Journal:
Vol. 13: Iss. 3, Article 8.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol13/iss3/8
INDIA NA LAW JOURNAL
of the forum to determine this question. Is it not rather anomalous, however,
that the law of the forum should be applied to determine the classification of a
rule of law which is to be made applicable to a transaction which was com-
pletely consummated in another state, and which was necessarily signed, sealed,
and delivered according to the rules of law applicable in that state?O If the
law of the place of contracting, as is conceded in the principal case, determines
the nature, validity, construction, and effect of the instrumentll should it not
also determine whether the distinction which it makes between sealed instru-
ments and simple contracts is substantive or procedural in nature?1 2
On the assumption that the law of Florida treats the distinction as one of
substance, the next step is to look to the Florida law to determine the juristic
category into which the instrument should be placed.13 Under the law of
Florida, it is clear that the contract is to be treated as a sealed instrument.1 4
It seems, then, that it should be so considered by the court at the forum when
the statute of limitations of New Hampshire is applied. If, on the other hand,
the Florida law treats the distinction between simple contracts and contracts
under seal as a matter of procedure, there could be no technical objection to a
similar qualification under the New Hampshire law.
Since, by this process,' uniformity in result can be obtained, it would appear
to be a valid criticism of the instant case that the court ignored an important
question, upon the solution of which may depend that uniformity which it is
the function of Conflict of Laws to obtain. R. W. W.
CRIMINAL LAW-EFFECT OF BREACH OF DUTY BY MINISTERIAL OFFICER-
SENTENCES OF STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS-On June 2, 1930, the federal court
convicted the petitioner of impersonating a federal officer, sentenced him to six
years in prison, and issued a warrant for his commitment on the same day,
directing the marshal to deliver him to the United States penitentiary "forth-
with." The marshal neglected to carry out the order, retained custody of the
prisoner, and later over the protests of the petitioner turned him over to state
authorities who had previously filed an information (on May 14, 1930) charging
forgery against him. The state arraigned him for trial, and on July 31, 1930,
foreign transaction is matter of substance or procedure, will examine the
entire nature of the transaction, including the statute or principal of law which
created the alleged right and the interpretation thereof; but will not inquire
whether the foreign court will call the various rules involved in the transaction
substantive or procedural." But observe in, note 10, the comment by McClintock
on this section. The final draft of the Restatement materially rephrases this
section.
1o McClintock, supra, note 7, says, "The statement of the comment that the
forum 'will not enquire whether the foreign court would call the various rules
involved in the transaction substantive of procedural' is manifestly contrary
to the general theory of the Restatement that in the field of conflict of laws
one deals principally with the jurisdiction of states to create rights and the
enforcement of the rights so created in other jurisdictions."; Burns Mortgage
Co. v. Fried (1934), 292 U. S. 487, 54 S. Ct. 813; Precort v. Driscoll (1931), 85
N. H. 280, 157 A. 525; Halsey v. McLean (1816), 94 Mass. 438.
11 Supra, note 2.
12 Supra, note 10.
13 Supra, note 2.
14 Compiled General Laws Florida, 1927, Secs. 5704, 5705.
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petitioner changed his former plea of "not guilty" to "guilty." The state court
* then sentenced him for an indeterminate period of one to fourteen years in the
state prison. After serving five years in the state prison he was released on
parole and then the marshal took him to the federal penitentiary to serve out
his time under the sentence of the federal court. In habeas corpus proceedings
petitioner sought to have the time served in the state prison counted upon his
federal sentence. On June 29, 1932, a federal statute wag enacted which pro-
vided that the sentence of a federal prisoner was to start from the date on
which the prisoner was received, at the place of detention (18 U.S.C.A., Sec.
709a). The majority of the court held that the petitioner was entitled to count
the time spent in the state prison upon his federal sentence. 1
In this case the prisoner has committed different and distinct offenses against
two jurisdictions. Logically it should follow that he should have to serve both
sentences to satisfy the debt exacted by society. But by the decision of the
majority the unauthorized act of the marshal destroyed all rights the federal
government had to have its power vindicated. It is respectfully suggested that
the opposite decision should have been reached.
The majority did not take into consideration that the effect of the unauthorized
act of the marshal was abetted by failure of the petitioner to maintain his plea
of "not guilty." It has been decided that a federal court is not required to allow
the effect of its judgment to be nullified in any part by act of a petitioner or
of a state court.2 Moreover, in absence of positive statutes covering the sub-
ject, inaction, procrastination, or delay on the part of public officials does not
prejudice the rights of a sovereign.8
The majority opinion held that the sentence of the petitioner started "at
the time of his sentence and the commitment and custory thereunder by the
marshal." No mention was made of the statute stating that sentence was to
start only when the prisoner was delivered to the place of detention. Upon a
review of the authorities, it is found that the 1932 statute merely codified the
prevalent practice and thus did not prejudice the petitioner's position. In 16
Corpus Juris, section 3228, it is said "as a general rule the term of imprisonment
for which D is sentenced begins, with the first day of actual incarceration in
prison." 4 Two other rules are quoted as being minority views. (1) Sentence
begins from the time sentence is pronounced. 5 (2) Sentence begins from the
time of date of entry in the judgment.6 It is evident then that it is error for
1 Smith v. Swope (1937), 91 F. (2d) 260.
2 Ex Parte McCullen (1928), 29 F. (2d) 852.
3 State v. School District No. 3, Chautauqua Co. (1885), 34 Kan. 237, 8 P.
208; State v. Dixon (1913), 90 Kan. 594-, 135 P. 568, 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 905;
Dement v. Rokker (1888), 126 Il1. 174, 19 N. E. 33; Terre Haute & I. R. Co. v.
State ex rel. Ketcham, Att. Gen. (1902), 159 Ind. 438, 65 N. E. 401.
4Bradford v. People (1896), 22 Colo. 157, 43 P. 1013; Miller v. Evans
(1901), 115 Ia. 101, 8S N. W. 198, 56 L. R. A. 101; Clifford v. State (1869), 30
Md. 575; Mims v. State of Minn. (1880), 26 Minn. 494, 5 N. W. 369; People
ex rel. Stokes, Warden (1876), 66 N. Y. 342; Arnold v. Schmidt (1913), 155
Wis. 55, 143 N. W. 1055; State v. Grottkau (1888), 73 Wis. 589, 41 N. W. 1063,
9 Am. S. R. 816.
5Ex parte Adams (1911), Ala. 105, 54- So. 501; Ex parte Meyers (1869),
44 Mo. 279.
6 Braxton v. State (1912), 103 Miss. 127, 60 S. 66; Rhea v. United States
(1897), 6 Okla. 249, 50 P. 992.
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a court to attribute any effect to the warrant of commitment for determining
when a sentence shall begin.
At most the warrant is but an order or process by which the court directs
a ministerial officer to take a person to prison or detain him there. 7 It supplies
authority for a warden to receive a prisoner and to hold him for a given
length of time; when the warrant expires so does the authority to hold the
prisoner any longer.8 The commitment represents merely a ministerial act, as
distinguished from a judicial function; therefore, the decision of Bernstein 'U.
United States9 should control the court's decision. It was there decided "if,
for any reason, execution of the sentence has been delayed, the court at a sub-
sequent term may change the commitment order and may compel the petitioner
to serve the added time".1 0
The federal court has power to vacate any order entered in respect to a
remittitur when it learns that serving of federal sentence has been interfered
with by the prisoner's serving of a state sentence for an entirely different offense
than that imposed by the federal court.1 1 So it cacid have done here.-
It is conceded that ordinarily sentences run concurrently in the absence of
specific provisions in a judgment to the contrary.1 2 The American Law Institute
substantiates our view that the sentences should not have been deemed to be
concurrent; it holds "sentences of imprisonment for offenses not charged in
the same indictment or information shall be served consecutively unless ex-
pressly directed otherwise." 1 3 Sentence to imprisonment in a federal penitentiary
cannot be satisfied by servitude in a state prison.1 4
By the decision of the majority the petitioner began serving his sentence
at the date of the sentence and commitment and custody thereunder by the
marshal; it would follow then that at the time he was on trial before the state
court he was serving his sentence. Both the federal courts1 5 and the state
courts1 6 hold that where one who is already serving a sentence is convicted
in another court the sentences will not run concurrently. How then could the
sentences be concurrent here? W. E. 0.
7 People ex rel. Wojek v. Henderson (1937), 295 N. Y. S. 173, 178, 134
Misc. 228; Commonwealth v. Barker (1882), 133 Mass. 399; People v. Hagen
(1902), 170 N. Y. 46, 49, 62 N. E. 1086.
8 United States v. Marrin (1915), 227 F. 314.
9 (1918), 254- F. 967; see authorities collected in 3 A. L. R. 1569.
10 Bernstein v. United States (1918), 254 F. 967.
11 Ex parte McCullen (1928), 29 F. (2d) 852.
12 United States v. Patterson (1887), 29 F. 775; Ex parte Lawson (1924),
98 Tex. Cr. R. 544, 266 S. W. 1101; Zerbst v. Walker (1933), 67 F. (2) 667,
"Even though of different courts"; contra: Hightower v. Hollis (1904), 121 Ga.
159, 48 S. E. 969.
13 Code of Criminal Procedure, Official Draft, June 15, 1931, Sec. 402, p. 105.
14 Ex parte Aubert (1931), 51 F. (2d) 136; Ex parte Lamar (1921), 274
F. 160.
15Ex parte McCullen (1928), 29 F. (2d) 852; Bernstein v. United States
(1918), 254 F. 967; Ex parte Aubert (1931), 51 F. (2d) 136.
16 State v. Ryder (1930), 119 Neb. 704, 230 N. W. 586. "When sentence is
pronounced upon one already serving a sentence from another court a second
sentence doesn't begin until the sentence which the prisoner is serving has
expired."
